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Abstract 
Professional football has evolved over time from a sport to a business, and that reflects in 
player transfers. In times of scarce resources, it is important for the clubs to invest with 
some restraint, looking to avoid big expenses in players that will not perform as expected. 
The valuation of the players’ rights is, therefore, an important matter on the topic of 
football club management. 
If every player is regarded as having a different set of skills, abilities and physical 
characteristics, then the correspondent sporting rights can be classified as heterogeneous 
products. Thus, the application of the hedonic pricing method can allow for a better 
understanding of how the transfer values are defined. The goal of this study is therefore 
to determine if these transfer values can be explained by the players’ performance in their 
recent past. 
For this purpose, transfers between clubs of each of the Big5 leagues were analysed, along 
with data regarding the players’ sporting performance and other characteristics (such as 
club reputation or player’s popularity), through an analysis of publicly available data. The 
OLS estimation of different models showed that recent performance does not explain the 
whole of the transfer fees, with other variables being required to explain the bigger 
picture. 
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Resumo 
O futebol professional evoluiu ao longo do tempo de um desporto para um negócio, e isso 
reflete-se nas transferências de jogadores. Em tempos de recursos escassos, é importante 
para os clubes investir com algum controlo, tentando evitar grandes despesas em 
jogadores que não vão ter uma performance tão boa como o esperado. A avaliação dos 
direitos dos jogadores é, então, um ponto importante no que respeita à gestão de clubes 
de futebol. 
Se se considerar que todos os jogadores possuem um certo conjunto de habilidades, 
capacidades e características físicas, então os direitos desportivos desses jogadores 
podem ser considerados produtos heterogéneos. Assim, a aplicação do método de preços 
hedónicos pode permitir uma melhor compreensão de como os valores das transferências 
são definidos. O objetivo deste estudo é, portanto, determinar se esses montantes das 
transferências podem ser explicados pela performance desportiva dos jogadores no seu 
passado recente. 
Para atingir este fim, foram analisadas transferências entre clubes de cada uma das 5 
maiores ligas da Europa, juntamente com dados relativos à performance desportiva dos 
jogadores e outras características (como reputação do clube ou popularidade do jogador), 
através de uma análise de informação disponível publicamente. A estimação OLS de 
diferentes modelos mostrou que a performance recente não explica a totalidade do 
montante das transferências, sendo necessárias outras variáveis para explicar toda a 
realidade. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Preços hedónicos, futebol profissional, avaliação de ativos no futebol, 
avaliação de ativos intangíveis, contabilidade no futebol. 
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“It is no use saying ‘We are doing our best’. 
 You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary.” 
Winston Churchill 
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1. Introduction 
The fundamental idea in the Hedonic Pricing Method is that the price of a certain good is 
connected to its characteristics. The value of those characteristics to the consumer will be 
reflected on how much they are willing to pay for the good with or without those features, 
for instance. It is mostly used in the housing market, to value real estate regarding the 
characteristics of the house itself (square-footage, number of bedrooms) and the 
environment where it is included (neighborhood, proximity to schools or parks). The 
value of an extra bedroom, for example, can be observed as the difference between the 
prices a consumer is willing to pay for two houses in which all characteristics but the 
number of bedrooms are identical. Heterogeneity is thus key for Hedonic Pricing.  
Football players, as individuals with different sets of skills, abilities and physical 
characteristics, are clearly heterogeneous. The application of this method for valuing the 
players’ sporting rights does not seem, therefore, farfetched (in fact, it has been applied 
before by different authors). Although skills and abilities cannot be measured by 
themselves, their effective impact on the players’ performance can; to a certain extent, an 
attacking player’s performance, for example, can be measured through indicators such as 
number of goals, goals per game ratio or passes to goal. Other factors, like the club that 
owns the player’s rights or the agent that represents the player, are also distinctive and 
may influence the market value of that athlete’s sporting rights. 
The primary aim of this study is, thus, to understand if a player’s performance, among 
other factors, explains the amount exchanged between clubs for his transfer. Its relevance 
lies in the consequences of the results for football club management. In a context of 
limited resources, it is crucial that the investments in new athletes are rational and 
motivated by the potential to help in the clubs’ sporting (and, eventually, financial) 
objectives. For this reason, club management could benefit from understanding which 
variables influence, directly or indirectly, the price paid for an athlete’s rights, improving 
the negotiation and decision processes. 
For this purpose, the transfers between top clubs of each of the Big5 leagues (from 
England, Spain, Germany, Italy and France) were compiled into a database. After the 
appropriate variables were defined, data regarding the players’ sporting performance and 
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other variables was collected through an analysis of publicly available information. Then, 
the estimation of different models showed which variables explain the amount involved 
in a player transfer.  
Besides this section, this report is structured as follows: in Section 2, a literature review 
of this topic is made. In Section 3, the methodology is introduced, with the definition of 
the model and sample. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, while Section 5 
includes a brief discussion of the implications for club management. Section 6 features 
the conclusions of the study and recommendations for future studies.
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2. Literature Review 
The Hedonic Pricing Method is quite common in real estate or the automotive and wine 
industries, but not as much in the football business. Moreover, despite the media attention 
that football draws, concepts such as Third Party Ownership, economic rights of players 
and Financial Fair Play are sometimes not clear or wrongfully perceived. 
It is therefore essential to start this analysis with some contextualization and the 
definitions of the concepts that will be employed later on. 
 
2.1. Football as a business 
Football clubs have evolved over time, from simple sporting associations in the 19th 
century to the more complex entities we see today. Now, football is considered to be a 
business and some of the biggest clubs are listed in stock exchanges (Capasso & Rossi, 
2013) through their public limited sports companies (Sociedade Anónima Desportiva, in 
Portuguese). 
Nevertheless, football presents itself as a rather peculiar industry, in the sense that results 
have to be perceived from both a sporting and a financial perspective (Szymanski & 
Kuypers, 1999). Over the years, the financial structure of football clubs has suffered many 
changes, with the main sources of funding starting to be tickets for games, later on 
subsidies and more recently investments by privately owned companies. Publicity and 
sponsoring contracts grew in importance, along with television broadcasting rights 
(Andreff, 2006). The broadcasting rights disrupted the existing paradigm, increasing the 
difference between small and big clubs. Consequently, some small clubs, who saw their 
purchase power for new athletes’ rights reduced, decided to invest in training young 
players, rather than acquiring new stars (Lombardi et al., 2014). 
Following the changes in football club management, the trend was set to be a reduction 
of relative management costs. One of the answers for this problem presented itself as the 
division of a player’s economic rights, with the owner club sharing these rights with 
another party, such as a company or an investment fund.  
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2.1.1. The distinction between economic and federative rights 
A crucial distinction must be made at this point: that between economic rights and 
federative rights of a football player. The federative rights of an athlete are the rights that 
bind that athlete to the club he represents, through the employment contract established 
between the two parts. These rights, also called rights of pass, are what allow the players 
to represent the club in competitions, and must therefore be registered with the 
correspondent football federation. Given the mentioned features, only clubs can hold 
these rights, and the economic value associated to them corresponds to the “economic 
rights derived from the federative rights” (KPMG, 2013 and Cruz et al., 2011). 
The economic rights are therefore any financial rights that arise from the transfer of 
federative rights between two clubs, and the holders of these rights are also the clubs. 
However, unlike federative rights, these can be shared with a third party. This process 
requires a commercial relationship between the two parts, and it assigns the third party a 
future credit in case the player at stake is transferred (KPMG, 2013). This is the basic 
principle of a Third Party Ownership agreement. 
 
2.1.2. Third Party Ownership: roots and concepts 
Third Party Ownership’s origins lie in South America, being later on brought to European 
countries. The main allure was the fact it allowed clubs to acquire young stars while 
diversifying risk and reducing investment (versus a scenario without TPO), and with the 
third party assuming a position of potential capital gain with a future transfer of the player 
(Lombardi et al., 2014). 
TPO agreements can fit one of two different types: financing TPO and investment TPO 
(KPMG, 2013). The first corresponds to the situation where a club sells part of the 
economic rights of a specific player, thus receiving a certain amount. The second happens 
when a club acquires a player and, at the same time, part of the economic rights of that 
player are purchased by a third party. 
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For clubs, TPO presents itself as an alternative source of financing. Following the recent 
financial crisis, the availability of bank loans shrank, which forced clubs to look for other 
options (Andreff, 2011). Moreover, it allows clubs to make moves onto players that they 
would not be able to afford otherwise, and can be a solution to solve short term liquidity 
problems, through the aforementioned financing type of TPO. 
For the investors, the appeal of TPO is the possibility of obtaining significant profits, in 
theory unlimited, with a reduced level of risk. Most of the times the contracts feature 
clauses with minimum return or interest, thus the risk laying in the more or less small 
chance of the club entering a situation of insolvency (KPMG, 2013). 
 
2.2. Transfer markets and regulation 
Simmons (1997) states that transfer markets are operated in the majority of football 
leagues under the authority of FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) and, in Europe, of UEFA (Union of European Football Associations). They 
represent the only path that allows football clubs to be financially rewarded for their 
investment in the development of young players (Borges, 2011). Nevertheless, the rules 
and procedures associated to the movement of players between clubs have changed over 
time, with the Bosman ruling in the 1990s being a particularly disruptive factor. 
 
2.2.1. Transfer markets through time 
The first evidence of the transfer system lies in the English Football Association’s 
regulations in 1885, which demanded every player in the national leagues to be annually 
registered with that association (Constantino, 2006). The registered players were 
bounded to their clubs for as long as the clubs desired – if a player refused to renovate 
his contract at the end of the season, he could not play for another club unless the former 
club allowed it (Simmons, 1997). This restriction made it possible for a club to require 
a compensation fee from the new club in order to free that player. 
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This retain and transfer system in England was not challenged until the 1960s, and was 
finally abolished in 1978, giving place to a system of freedom of contract. A player was 
free to move to another club after his contract expired, but the previous club was still 
entitled to a compensation, determined by agreement between clubs or, if necessary, by 
an independent court. A higher mobility for players increased their bargaining power, 
especially for the most desired players. This led to a significant rise in player wages, 
which for decades had been limited (Gerrard, 2001). 
Under the new system, a player could be transferred for free (with no fee involved) if 
the club failed to make a contract offer that was similar or superior to the conditions 
provided before. In case a fair offer was made and rejected by the player, the club could 
still require a compensation fee (Simmons, 1997). 
Still according to Simmons (1997), before the 1995/1996 season most leagues had their 
transfer markets operating on two simple principles: first, a fee would have to be paid 
when a player wanted to change clubs, even if the player’s contract had ended; and 
second, the leagues enforced a strict control on the number of foreign players a team 
could play in a given match. The Bosman case motivated discussion regarding freedom 
of movement and led to a harmonization of rules and procedures in the different leagues. 
 
2.2.2. The Bosman ruling 
In 1990, Jean-Marc Bosman saw his contract with Belgian club R.C. Liegois expire. 
The club offered him a new contract, worth less the previous one, which the player 
rejected (Simmons, 1997). Bosman decided to sign a contract with the French club U.S. 
Dunkerque, with the new club being obliged to pay a fee to the Belgian club 
(Constantino, 2006). For Bosman to be able to play for his new club, the Belgian 
Federation would have to send his registration certificate to the French Federation, on 
request of Liegois. However, Liegois did not proceed with the request, due to their 
doubts on the French club’s solvency (Antonioni & Cubbin, 2000). As a result, Bosman 
could not take part in any game in the following season. Bosman took the matters to 
court, where he fought until 1995, claiming that the requirement of a fee limited his 
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freedom of mobility in the European Union, according to the Treaty of Rome 
(Constantino, 2006).  
In December 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of Bosman. The court 
decided the rule stating players without a contract could only move between clubs of 
different European Union countries if a transfer fee was agreed between clubs was 
incompatible with the principle of freedom of labor established by the Treaty of Rome. 
Moreover, the same principle did not allow for a limitation of the number of foreign 
players in a club (Simmons, 1997). 
This ruling led to a single, European labor market for football players and extended their 
contractual freedom. According to Gerrard (2001), a major consequence of the outcome 
of the Bosman case and the free agency associated to it was that a player’s transfer value 
became dependent on the remaining duration of his present contract. 
 
2.2.3. Financial fair play and TPO regulation 
The regulation in European football has been a standard practice ever since UEFA was 
created. However, recent developments regarding financial performance of the clubs 
have forced that organism to intervene with somewhat strict financial regulations. The 
idea of regulating club finances is not new, as a limit for maximum costs had already 
been discussed in the beginning of the past decade (Preuss et al., 2014). 
More recently, UEFA has introduced the Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules, which aim to 
soften the differences between clubs and provide equality of opportunities, while forcing 
the clubs to pursue more sustainable financial management practices. The basic principle 
clubs have to obey is the so-called “break even requirement” that forces clubs to limit its 
expenses to the approximate value of its income in the last seasons (Lombardi et al., 
2014). The failure to comply with such criteria may result in the club facing sanctions, 
such as fines, transfer bans or exclusion from European competitions (Petit, 2014).  
The use of a mechanism such as Third Party Ownership, that can impact the balance sheet 
through asset valuation, for example, has led UEFA to act on occasion. The lack of 
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transparency existing in these moves has an impact that goes further than the sporting 
ethics, affecting the fulfilment of UEFA’s requirements regarding Financial Fair Play. 
The regulation has thus been reformulated and strengthened, but the limitations imposed 
by the European Union’s freedom of circulation of people and capital did not allow UEFA 
to go much further (Lombardi et al., 2014). However, and with UEFA’s support, FIFA 
acted on the topic of TPO by establishing that “no club shall enter into a contract which 
enables any other party to that contract or any third party to acquire the ability to influence 
in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the 
performance of its teams” (FIFA, 2014). The general interpretation was that FIFA had 
prohibited third party influence, thus leaving space for ambiguity (Amado & Lorenz, 
2015). To end such issue, FIFA reviewed the rules to include a new article, stating that 
“no club or player shall enter into agreement with a third party whereby a third party is 
being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation 
to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights 
in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation” (FIFA, 2015). Starting on the 
beginning of May, 2015 the TPO was prohibited, with the previously signed contracts 
being allowed to continue in place until their expiration date, without the possibility to 
extend it. Moreover, clubs were obliged to inform FIFA of all the existing TPO contracts 
and upload them to an online platform (FIFA, 2015) 
 
2.3. Footballers as intangible assets 
According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IAS 38), an asset is “a 
resource that is controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future 
economic benefits are expected”. The three critical attributes of an asset are, therefore, 
identifiability, control and future economic benefits.  
Constantino (2006) states that in a football team, a player is a separable and distinct 
element, one that can be replaced, sold and provide future economic benefits. The club 
does not own the player himself, but rather the federative rights, which as stated before 
are born with the employment contract between the two parts (Borges, 2011). 
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To consider a certain element as an asset, the company must be able to control the future 
economic benefits that it can origin, as well as to stop others to collect those same 
benefits. Since the terms of the sports contracts and the rules imposed by FIFA and UEFA 
prevent the players from leaving the clubs without compensation or against the clubs’ 
will, then the clubs hold control over the federative rights of the footballers and the 
economic benefits that can from these arise (Constantino, 2006). Control must be a 
consequence of a past event, such as a transaction or even self-creation. In football, the 
first would be a transfer among clubs, while the second would correspond to the players 
developed within the club. The defining moment will be the signing of the contract 
between club and player, as it is from that point in time that the club holds the economic 
rights of the player, corresponding to the future economic benefits (Constantino, 2006). 
Since all three defining conditions to consider a certain element as an asset are met, then 
it is established that the federative rights of a football player are in fact an asset for the 
club. However, it is still necessary to evaluate if it is an intangible asset. 
An intangible asset is “an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance”, 
according to IAS 38. The federative rights are incorporeal and acquired with the purpose 
of generating benefits for the club (Constantino, 2006). These benefits are not only 
economic, but also sporting – the contribution of the players for the club performance 
success is intangible (Michie & Verma, 1999). 
The federative rights of a football player, representing his skills and abilities, can thus be 
classified as an intangible asset, and therefore be included in the balance sheet of the 
owner club. 
However, traditionally, any valuation of football players was excluded from the club’s 
balance sheet, regardless of those athletes being transferred in or developed in-house 
(Morrow, 1996). The transfers were regarded as costs or revenues in the corresponding 
period (Rowbottom, 2002). Over the last two decades, this situation has changed, as clubs 
realized that such policy did not represent a fair view of the financial situation.  
The most popular methods for player valuation in the balance sheet are historical cost and 
in-house determined value (Rowbottom, 2002). With the first comes an amortization of 
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the paid amount over the length of the contract until a certain residual value is reached. 
This method does not allow clubs to attribute value to internally developed players, or 
players that were not purchased (Rowbottom, 2002), as happens when they are recruited 
after contract with the previous club expires (Constantino, 2006). Rowbottom (2002) 
presents the second approach as determined through the assessment made by the 
managers or club directors, who determine the player’s value, corrected by reevaluations 
and transfers. This alternative no longer poses a barrier to the valuation of youth players 
generated in-house. 
 
2.4. Hedonic Price Method 
Hedonic pricing is usually applied to differentiated goods, such as real estate, cars or 
wine. In 1966 Lancaster adapted the neoclassical model, considering not the goods 
themselves, but the characteristics or properties of those goods instead. Each of those 
goods may have a large amount of properties or characteristics, with the definition of the 
relevant ones being dependent on consumer behavior, determined by experience (Cohen, 
2009). 
According to Cohen (2009), there are three assumptions for a good to be suitable for the 
application of hedonic pricing: 
1. The good has characteristics that are both objective and 
measurable, meaning that even though not every consumer agrees on the 
appeal of such characteristics, they agree on their existence; 
2. The characteristics are valued differently by different consumers – 
for instance, when buying a house, a young couple might value proximity 
to city centre more than a view, while a retired couple might feel the 
opposite way; 
3. There is a linear and addictive nature to the relationship between 
good and characteristics, and therefore by doubling the quantity of the 
good the quantity of the characteristics doubles as well. 
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The hedonic regression produces coefficients (implicit, or hedonic prices) that are 
“interpreted as the effect on the market price of increasing a particular product attribute 
while holding the other attributes fixed” (Bajari et al, 2010). 
As stated by Borges (2011), the value of an asset is given by the sum of the value of each 
of its characteristics; thus, if both characteristics and individual values can be identified, 
the value of the asset can be estimated. In the case of football players, distinctive 
characteristics will lie on their particular abilities and skills, measured by performance. 
Applying this method will identify which observable characteristics provide market-
efficient predictors of the footballers’ performance in the future (Gerrard, 2001).  
This method has several advantages over other approaches. The traditional supply and 
demand model for establishing the price (in this case the transfer fee) would fail to capture 
the bigger part of the reality, as top players represent only a very small percentage of the 
total amount of professional footballers. Moreover, the lack of homogeneity and perfect 
information make it unfeasible to assess the value of an intangible asset through this 
approach (Borges, 2011). The hedonic price method suppresses the need for 
homogeneity, as its root is heterogeneity itself. 
Another alternative would be the historical price method, meaning players would be 
valued either by the sum of the costs the clubs incurred in for an athlete to achieve his 
current status or by the cost of substituting him for obtaining a similar one (Borges, 2011); 
however, once again, this would not take into consideration that each player has a 
different set of features that ultimately makes him unique. 
 
2.5. Similar studies 
With the growing popularity of the football business over the last decades came the 
scientific interest regarding the dynamics between clubs, from an economic and 
managerial point of view. Rowbottom (1998) developed a model for measuring player 
value at their replacement cost through an Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis 
with historical data. The author states that footballers with greater ability have the 
potential to generate more revenue for the club that he represents, and that makes them 
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more costly to substitute. As determinant characteristics, Rowbottom uses current 
footballing ability (including skill level, physical and mental fitness, along with 
performance standard) and expected footballing ability (based on age and potential skill 
level). The sample corresponded to the whole of the transfers from English clubs in the 
1994/1995 season, excluding free transfers, to a total of 253 cases. The goal of predicting 
value of player registrations for accounting purposes was achieved, as the model was 
successfully tested with selected transfers from the next season, presenting a high 
correlation coefficient. 
Gerrard (2001) built a composite player quality index that when aggregated for the 
different players of a club would present a team quality index. That indicator was based 
on observable characteristics such as age, experience and previous performance, thus 
representing an ex ante measure of a footballer’s quality. Through the application of the 
hedonic prices technique, those predictors of future performance would correspond to the 
systematic determinants of current player value. The sample comprised all the 539 players 
in the English top league in the 1998/1999 season, but the goal was to assess the relations 
between wages, quality per club and league performance, rather than transfer values. 
Gerrard and Dobson (2000) had already studied 1350 transfers in England from 1990 to 
1996, developing a formal model of the determination of the fees involved in player 
transfers. The presence of monopoly rents was empirically tested, after it was argued that 
the selling club could get “a share of any positive differential between the value of the 
player to the buying club (reflected in the maximum bid-price) and the selling club's 
reservation price”. 
Barrio and Puyol (2004) studied monopsony rents in the Spanish league in the 2001/2002 
season, with the particularity of the inclusion of a player popularity variable measured by 
the amount of references in a Google search. The results allow the authors to conclude 
that there are two segments in the labour market supply, where the most renowned players 
are overly paid (due to their greater bargaining power) at the expense of part of the 
monopsony rents captured by the clubs from regular players. 
Later on, Barrio and Puyol (2008) developed estimates of “fair transfer fees” for 
professional footballers, taking into consideration that media value (based on the players’ 
popularity) is the key intangible asset for players and clubs to generate revenue. The 
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sporting performance of the players is not taken into account, as the authors state that it 
is already included in the media value. These estimates are then compared to 84 actual 
transfers, with the model achieving an adjusted R square of 0.73.  
Borges (2011) conducts the study in which goals and methods are apparently closer to the 
ones intended with this dissertation. The sample includes 450 transfers among 15 
different leagues, between January 2005 and January 2011. The innovation introduced by 
Borges lies in the use of a football videogame with a large database to assess player 
characteristics, as an addition to the more frequent variables such as goals and games 
played; moreover, the countries’ GDP (through purchase power parity) is also included 
as a variable . The model draws from Gerrard (2001) and from Barrio and Pujol (2004), 
including a variable based on popularity through Google search results. Borges reached 
an adjusted R square of 0.76, and the results show that forwards are on average slightly 
more valuable than defenders and midfielders.  
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3. Methodological Aspects  
The objective of this chapter is to present the valuation method that this study intends to 
test, based on the existing literature on Hedonic Pricing and footballers’ valuation. The 
theory around the Hedonic Price Model was introduced before, but the model for this 
study will be specified in this section. The methodological aspects, such as the as the 
choice of databases and sample, are also featured in this section. 
 
3.1. Methodological aspects of similar studies 
The similar studies aforementioned had the similarity of relying on OLS estimations to 
reach their results. However, the sample sizes varied a lot, given the different countries 
in study, as well as the periods of analysis considered for compilation of transfers.  
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the reviewed studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors 
Country of 
study 
Sample 
size 
Period under 
analysis 
Statistical 
Analysis 
Rowbottom (1998) UK 253 1 year 
O
L
S
 reg
ressio
n
 
Gerrard & Dobson (2000) UK 1350 6 years 
Gerrard (2001) UK 539 1 year 
Barrio & Pujol (2008) Spain 84 1 year 
Borges (2011) 15 in Europe 450 6 years 
Table 1: Summary of the characteristics of studies reviewed 
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3.2. Sample 
The sample includes transfers between clubs from the top leagues of England (Barclay’s 
Premier League), Spain (La Liga BBVA), Germany (Bundesliga), Italy (Serie A) and 
France (Ligue 1), also known as the Big5 leagues, in three seasons: 2011/2012, 2012/2013 
and 2013/2014. 
In total, 383 transfers were analysed. 55 of these happened in the winter market (the 
“January transfer window”) and the remaining 328 in the summer market. The sample 
comprises 250 transfers within the same league, and 133 international transfers. 
Nearly 93% of the transfers included a fee equal to or above €1M (a total of 356), 54% 
equal or above €5M (a total of 208) and over 28% equal or above €10M (a total of 109). 
As expected, the 383 are distributed evenly throughout the three seasons: 136 in 
2011/2012, 114 in 2012/2013 and 133 in 2013/2014. 
The transfers chosen for the study were the ones that verified the following criteria:  
 Transfer happened between clubs featured in the Big5 leagues in the 
same season; 
 Transfer involved a disclosed fee (excludes simple loans and free 
transfers, as well as transfers in which the amount involved is 
unknown); 
 Transfer occured in the 2011/2012, 2012/2013 or 2013/2014 seasons; 
 Transferred athlete played for either the selling club or the buying club 
(if he was on loan) during the season prior to the transfer, or in the first 
half of the season in the case of winter transfers; 
 Transferred player played at least 900 minutes (corresponding to the 
duration of 10 games) in the domestic league in the previous season, 
or 450 minutes (5 games), in the season they were transferred, in case 
it happened in the January window; 
 Player is an outfield player (goalkeepers are not considered in the 
study); 
 There is all the necessary, detailed performance data for the transferred 
player in the corresponding season. 
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The data was obtained from different websites. The transfer fees, clubs and seasons could 
be found in TransferMarkt (http://www.transfermarkt.com), an originally German 
website that provides information regarding player transfers, market value and historical 
performance. The individual statistics, player personal data and performance index were 
drawn from WhoScored (http://www.whoscored.com), a website that provides detailed 
statistics (from Opta, a sports data company that works with companies such as Sky 
Sports, ESPN or BBC Sport), creates and compiles analysis on the major football 
competitions. The figures for player participation in International games for their National 
Teams were obtained from http://www.national-football-teams.com. The popularity of 
the players involved Google (http://www.google.com), as will be described later on. 
Although not all of the used data is official, it is nonetheless a close approximation and 
one that fits the purposes of this study.  
 
3.3. Model 
The model used in this study draws from Gerrard (2001), according to whom the hedonic 
pricing technique allows for the identification of the observable player features that can 
be regarded as providing good forecasts of future performance. The author proposes that 
the value of a player (𝑖) at a certain time (𝑡) depends on his expected future performance 
(𝑞𝑒): 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓𝑣(𝑞𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 )       (3.1) 
Moreover, the expected future performance can be predicted by player features 
(𝑋1,…, 𝑋m) observed in the recent past (𝑡 − 1): 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 =  𝑓𝑒(𝑋𝑖,1,𝑡−1, … , 𝑋𝑖,𝑚,𝑡−1)              (3.2) 
By substituting equation (3.2) into equation (3.1) and assuming a linear stochastic 
relationship, the result is: 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑋𝑖,1,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑚𝑋𝑖,𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (3.3) 
 
Equation 3.3 represents, then, the hedonic-pricing relationship for the value of a player. 
In this context, the coefficients 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑚 correspond to the hedonic prices for the 
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observed player characteristics, while 𝑎0 is the component of the player’s value that is 
independent of his features. Gerrard (2001) states that this component captures the effect 
of wages or transfer fee inflation, for example. For the purpose of the OLS regression, it 
is assumed that the term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 has constant error, is independent and fitting the normal 
distribution, with the mean of zero. 
 
3.4. Variables 
The variables included in the study are not significantly different from previous studies 
on this matter. The main intended differentiation factor is the combination of variables 
from different studies, along with the introduction of a new one – the performance index.  
This index goes further than the traditional statistics (goals, assists) as it includes all the 
impact of a player in the game, from passing success to the percentage of headers won. 
The set of variables used in this study can be separated in two groups, depending on them 
being related to the players or the clubs. 
 
3.4.1. Player-related variables 
The dependent variable is, naturally, the transfer fee (FEE) - this is the variable that the 
study aims at explaining with the following explanatory variables. 
Two characteristics of the players that do not depend on their performance are age and 
height. The importance of the first has its foundation in the fact that a football player’s 
professional career usually lasts approximately between their 18 and 34 years of age, with 
the market value of the player being significantly different in diverse phases of his career. 
While the players are young and still developing their skills, their value will be lower than 
when they reach the peak of their abilities; from that point on, the value will decrease 
again, as the players lose some physical capability. The average age at which the players 
reach their peak varies according to the sources, ranging from 24 to 27. The height 
variable is straightforward, and is presented in centimetres (HEIGHT). Two dummies, 
RIGHT and LEFT will take the value 1 if the player’s stronger foot is the right or the left 
one, respectively; if both dummies take the value 0, then the player is equally good with 
both feet. The relevance of including these variables lies in the reduced number of left 
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footed players when compared to right footed players; moreover, a player that is equally 
good with both feet may be more valuable than a player that can only rely on one of his 
feet to be successful in a game. 
The number of minutes played in the domestic league in a certain season (MINUTES) 
allows for understanding of both the player’s endurance and his importance for the team. 
The limits imposed in the sample (900 minutes for a full season or 450 for half a season) 
guarantee that the player took part in a minimum number of games before being 
transferred, and that his performance may have influenced the transfer fee. It is a better 
variable than the number of games, as a footballer may play 1 minute or 90 minutes in a 
certain game, a dimension not captured here but one that MINUTES does take into 
account. To complete the assessment of the player’s importance, the ratio between the 
number of times he was part of the starting XI (the eleven players that start the game) and 
the total of games in which he participated can be defined (FIRSTXI). 
The number of goals scored (GOALS) is one of the most important aspects when it comes 
to the performance of an attacking player. Moreover, the relative weight of his goals in 
the total of goals scored by the team (GOALRATIO) is a proxy of how important he is 
for the team’s success. Similarly to goals, passes to goal, also known as assists (ASSISTS) 
are an indicator of the player’s performance. The number of yellow and red cards 
(YELLOW and RED) awarded to a player will negatively impact their performance, 
unlike the amount of shots per game (SHOTSPG) or the success rate of their passes 
(PASSING). The number of aerial duels won (AERIALS) consist in the fights for the ball 
in which the player beat his opponent with a header. When a player’s performance is 
regarded as the best among all the players in a specific game, he is awarded a Man of the 
Match award (MOTM). The performance of a player in a game can however be summed 
up in one single value, the OPTA index provided by WhoScored; RATING will then 
present the average rating of a player on all the league matches in which he participated 
in a given season. This value takes into account every action taken by a player in the field, 
be it defensive or offensive, and it is one of the key differentiation points of this study 
when compared to previous ones. RATING can be expected to have a high correlation 
with the other performance variables indicated above, as it comprises all of them into a 
single number. The estimation will tell which of the two (index or set of statistics) has a 
better explanatory value.  
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The second dummy (UCL) takes the value 1 if the player participated in any UEFA 
Champions League game in the previous season (or present season for players transferred 
in the winter). The UEFA Champions League is widely considered as the most important 
club competition, and therefore one where the players’ participation and performance can 
be particularly important for their value and distinguishability. UCLGAMES will present 
the number of games in which a player participated for his team in the UEFA Champions 
League, and UCLRATING the aggregated performance rating supplied by WhoScored 
for this competition. 
There is another important dimension in football besides league games and the 
Champions League, the international games. A player’s value will be higher if he 
represents his National Team, as those are believed to be the best players of each country. 
Therefore, GAMESNT will show the number of games for the national team a certain 
player took part in (in the civil year in which the season began, for example 2013 when 
the transfer happened in 2013/2014, and 2012 when the transfer occurred in 2012/2013). 
The goals for the National Team (GOALSNT) also boost a player’s popularity, and are 
therefore an important variable. WhoScored only provides data for National Teams’ 
games when they are part of a major competition (World Cup, European Cup), thus 
excluding qualification games and friendlies; for this reason, only goals were considered 
for the performance in this case. 
Four dummies define the player’s position: FORWARD takes the value 1 if the player is 
a winger or striker, ATTMID takes the value 1 if the player is an attacking midfielder, 
DEFMID takes the value 1 if the player is a central or defensive midfielder, and 
FULLBACK, that takes the value 1 if the player is a fullback. If all of those take the value 
0, then the player is a centre-back. 
The player’s popularity can be a proxy of his transfer value, as concluded by Barrio and 
Pujol (2004). As stated before, the authors used the number of hyperlinks returned when 
searching for a player’s name on Google as an indicator of his popularity. This study will 
use the same procedure to assess the player’s popularity, under the variable GOOGLE.  
The players’ representatives, or agents, play a crucial part in the transfer negotiations, 
smoothing the talks between clubs and reclaiming the best conditions (club and salary) 
for their players. Ceteris paribus, it is expected that a more successful agent (such as Jorge 
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Mendes) will manage to place a player in a more important club than a less experienced 
agent. Another important aspect when it comes to a transfer is whether there is or not a 
third party involved. Although TPO is not allowed in England, it can be used by a Spanish 
club to acquire a player from the Premier League, for example. However, both of these 
dimensions were omitted from the study, as historical data was unobtainable. 
Ideally, the remaining duration of the player’s contract before the transfer should also be 
taken into consideration; nevertheless, and similarly to information on agents and TPO, 
it was impossible to access such data with the available resources. 
Table 2 summarizes the player-related variables and their descriptions. 
 
3.4.2. Club-related variables 
The main factors related to the clubs that can affect the transfer value are their reputation 
and classification in the past season, besides the reputation of the league they are featured 
in. Therefore, the variables SELLCLUBREP and BUYCLUBREP will represent the 
seller club’s and buyer club’s reputation, respectively. The reputation will be measured 
by the club’s position in the UEFA Club Ranking for the five years before the transfer 
occurred. A small number will therefore represent a higher reputation, and vice-versa. If 
the club is not featured in the ranking (in case it has not played in the UEFA Champions 
League or Europa League in the last 5 years), a value of 200 will be attributed, considering 
the gross majority of clubs featured after this position in the UEFA ranking are less known 
clubs from leagues with a worse reputation than the Big5 leagues. 
The reputation of the leagues of the seller club and buyer club (SELLLEAGUEREP and 
BUYLEAGUEREP) can be measured by the league’s position in the UEFA country 
rankings. Expectedly, the ranking will represent the competitiveness and prestige of the 
league, which will affect the perception of the player’s value and performance. 
The CLASSIFICATION will represent the club’s position in the national league in the 
previous year (1 if the club was the champion, for example). It is expected that a player 
that was crowned champion in the past season sees his value increase, therefore making 
the club classification an apparently relevant variable. If the club was promoted to the top 
league this season, the classification will be calculated by adding its classification in the 
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secondary league to the number of clubs in the top league (for example, when the 
champion of the second league is promoted to a 20-club top league, its classification in 
the previous season will be 21). Besides these, the dummy INTERNATIONAL will take 
the value 1 if the transfer was negotiated between clubs of different leagues, and 0 if 
negotiated between clubs of the same league, to check for significant differences in fees 
of national versus international transfers. 
There are more aspects of the transfer that could be included in either the player or club 
related variables, but were included in this section. The dummy WINTER takes the value 
1 when the transfer happened in the January transfer window, and 0 when the transfer 
occurred in the summer, thus allowing for the study of the potential impact of the transfer 
date in the fee. 
It is a growing practice for clubs to acquire players on loans, be those short or long term; 
it is also common for those clubs to purchase the sporting rights for the loaned player if 
the player’s stay at the club is successful. For that reason, the dummy LOANED was 
included to capture a possible effect on transfer fee of the loan of a player at the buying 
club.  
A summary of these club-related variables is featured in Table 3. 
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Category Variable Description 
Physiognomy 
AGE Player’s age at the date of the transfer, in years 
HEIGHT Player’s height in centimetres 
RIGHT Dummy: 1 if the player’s stronger foot is the right one 
LEFT Dummy: 1 if the player’s stronger foot is the left one 
Performance 
MINUTES Number of minutes played in the past season * 
FIRSTXI 
Ratio between games as a starter and total of games in the 
past season * 
GOALS Number of goals scored in the past season * 
GOALRATIO 
Ratio between goals scored by the player and the team in 
the past season * 
ASSISTS Number of assists in the past season * 
YELLOW 
Number of yellow cards awarded to the player in the past 
season * 
RED 
Number of red cards awarded to the player in the past 
season * 
SHOTSPG Average number of shots per game in the past season * 
PASSING Average passing success rate in the past season * 
AERIALS Average number of aerial duels won in the past season * 
MOTM Number of Man of the Match awards in the past season * 
RATING Average performance rating in the past season * 
UCL 
Dummy: 1 if the player played in the UEFA Champions 
League in the past season * 
UCLGAMES 
Number of games played in the UEFA Champions League 
in the past season * 
UCLRATING 
Average performance rating in the UEFA Champions 
League in the past season * 
GAMESNT 
Number of games played for the National Team in the last 
civil year 
GOALSNT 
Number of goals scored for the National Team in the last 
civil year 
Position 
FORWARD Dummy: 1 if the player is a forward 
ATTMID Dummy: 1 if the player is an attacking midfielder 
DEFMID Dummy: 1 if the player is a central or defensive midfielder 
FULLBACK Dummy: 1 if the player is a full back 
Other GOOGLE 
Number of hyperlinks associated to the player’s name and 
year previous to the transfer in Google 
*in the season of the transfer, if the transfer occurred in the January window 
 
Table 2: Summary of the player-related variables and their descriptions. 
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Category Variable Description 
Reputation 
SELLCLUBREP Selling club’s position in the UEFA ranking 
BUYCLUBREP Buying club’s position in the UEFA ranking 
SELLLEAGUEREP Selling club’s league position in the UEFA ranking 
BUYLEAGUEREP Buying club’s league position in the UEFA ranking 
Performance CLASSIFICATION Selling club classification in the past season 
Other 
INTERNATIONAL 
Dummy: 1 if the transfer happened between clubs 
of different countries 
WINTER 
Dummy: 1 if the transfer occurred in the winter 
window  
LOANED 
Dummy: 1 if the player was on loan to the buyer 
club immediately before the transfer 
Table 3: Summary of the club-related variables and their descriptions. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
The theoretical model and set of variables chosen led to the creation of two different 
set of models, each of those with 3 variations. The first, set A, includes both the player 
and club related variables; on the other hand, set B includes only player-related 
variables, as that was the main target of the study. For each set, three models will be 
presented: A1 and B1 comprise all the variables, A2 and B2 maximize adjusted-r2 (by 
trial and error), while A3 and B3 include statistically significant variables only. 
The expected behavior of all the variables can be found in Table 4, below: 
 
 
 
Variable Signal Variable Signal 
AGE - UCLGAMES + 
HEIGHT + UCLRATING + 
RIGHT - GAMESNT + 
LEFT + GOALSNT + 
MINUTES + FORWARD + 
FIRSTXI + ATTMID + 
GOALS + DEFMID - 
GOALRATIO + FULLBACK - 
ASSISTS + GOOGLE + 
YELLOW - SELLCLUBREP + 
RED - BUYCLUBREP + 
SHOTSPG + SELLLEAGUEREP + 
PASSING + BUYLEAGUEREP + 
AERIALS + CLASSIFICATION + 
MOTM + INTERNATIONAL + 
RATING + WINTER + 
UCL + LOANED - 
Table 4: Expected relation between variables and transfer fee. 
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A summary of the results of the different models is presented in the Table 5: 
 
 
 
This summary clearly shows that the initial amount of variables was too high, with 
several of them appearing to be of little (or none) consequence in the explanatory value 
of the models. The intent of moving from models A1 to A2 (and similarly from B1 to 
B2) was to maximize the value of the adjusted r2, as this index measures how close the 
estimated and observed values while taking into consideration the number of variables 
involved – r2 by itself does not capture this dimension. From A1 to A2, 12 variables 
were removed and the adjusted r2 increased by 1%, meaning that the inclusion of those 
12 variables was in fact harmful to the explanatory value of the initial model; likewise, 
by removing 10 variables from B1 to B2, the adjusted r2 rose by 0.6%. In both cases the 
value of the r2 diminished slightly. Both sets present lower adjusted r2 values when only 
statistically significant variables are considered – at this point we can conclude that a 
big number of initially chosen variables are of no statistical consequence to the 
explanation of the players’ transfer fees. 
Comparing the results of Set A (Club and player related variables) with those of Set B 
(player variables only), it is clear that the model benefits from these additional variables. 
However, that increase is small: 2.8% is the maximum difference, reached when both A 
 Set A Set B 
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 
N 383 383 383 383 383 383 
R2 62.5% 62.2% 56.7% 59.5% 58.9% 56% 
Adjusted R2 59.0% 60.0% 55.3% 56.6% 57.2% 54.9% 
S.E. of regression 6.69 6.61 6.99 6.88 6.84 7.02 
Akaike info criterion 6.72 6.67 6.76 6.76 6.72 6.76 
Schwarz criterion 7.07 6.9 6.89 7.03 6.89 6.86 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.99 1.97 2.04 1.98 1.97 1.97 
Variables 34 22 13 26 16 10 
Table 5: Summary of the results of the different models. 
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and B see their adjusted r2 values peak. If we take into consideration the models with 
significant variables only, that difference shrinks to 0.4%.  
Overall, the obtained results are those presented by other studies on the topic. This study 
differed from previous others by including international transfers, albeit limited to the 
Big5 leagues, and presenting the performance rating as a key variable. This index is 
probably the biggest recent breakthrough regarding publicly available statistical data for 
football, and one that should be taken into consideration for future studies. The 
suggestions for future research, along with the discussion of the low explanatory value 
of the models, will be further detailed in Section 6 of this study. 
Looking at the models individually, some variables were immediately spotted as being 
of no statistical significance. In this group fall AERIALS, RED and YELLOW. 
CLASSIFICATION and FIRSTXI are also featured here, although coming as more of a 
surprise than the first ones. The club classification was expected to have some impact 
in the players’ rights value, similarly to a player’s ratio of games as a starter (as it 
arguably shows how important a player is to the team) – this can however be countered 
by the variable MINS, that is significant at 95% in every model, and positively 
influences value. 
The WINTER variable was not significant, contrary to expectations. In theory, a January 
transfer would be slightly more expensive than a summer transfer, as clubs are less open 
to changing their squads during the season. A player’s stronger foot, presented by LEFT 
and RIGHT, is inconsequent as well.  
Nonetheless, the variables which lack of significance raises more questions are the 
position dummies. FULLBACK is the only position significant in every model, with a 
negative coefficient indicating that players in this position are less expensive than the 
remaining, but allowing for no conclusion as for the relation between those other 
positions. 
Like FULLBACK, other variables were statistically significant at 95% or even 99% 
confidence across all models. AGE has a negative coefficient around -0.80 for both A3 
and B3, showing that transfer value reduces as a player ages. This result was expected, 
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since players with high potential and peaking players are usually more expensive than 
those in a more advanced career stage. GAMESNT positively influences value, as 
players increase their visibility and prestige when representing their countries. A very 
odd result rose in GOALRATIO, showing a negative influence of the player’s 
percentage of goals in the total of team goals (coefficients of -82 in A3 and -80 in B3). 
The explanation for this is unclear, as a club would expectably be more reluctant to sell 
a player that has a big part in their success, thus negotiating at higher values. 
As expected, GOALS and RATING have a strong, positive impact on the transfer fees, 
with both being significant at the 99% confidence level in all models. 
The player’s popularity, measured by GOOGLE, is significant with 95% confidence in 
B3, but fails to be so in Set A. This is, in fact, along with PASSING, one of the only 2 
variables that are significant in B3 (player related only) and not significant when club 
variables are introduced in A3. 
On the other hand, from A3 we can infer that the club-related variables that are of 
statistical significance to the study (with 99% confidence) are SELLCLUBREP, 
SELLLEAGUEREP and LOANED. All of these have a negative coefficient; this is 
straightforward for LOANED, as a loan usually involve the payment of a fee upfront 
(usually undisclosed), with the exercise of the buy-option corresponding to the effective 
transfer fee considered in the study. As for the reputation of selling clubs and leagues, 
a positive impact was initially expected: better reputation could lead to higher 
bargaining power when selling a player. Nonetheless, the most known and powerful 
clubs do not usually rely on transfer income to support a big part of their budgets; 
moreover, these tend to pay higher wages than smaller clubs. Both conditions combined 
can lead these clubs to require a smaller fee to liberate a player, thus explaining the 
negative relation between selling club reputation and transfer fee. 
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5. Consequences for Club Management 
Nowadays many football clubs face challenges when it comes to obtaining financing, 
with some solutions ranging from bank loans to TPO agreements, for instance. This 
difficulty forces clubs to be more careful in the way they allocate money in their 
budgets; transfers are a big part of some clubs’ budgeting process – yearly targets for 
the sale of player rights is not uncommon, and investment caps are a reality especially 
for small and medium-sized clubs. In Portugal, for example, it has become common 
practice for the top clubs (medium size clubs at the European scale) to issue 
bonds/obtain loans with the future sale of a player as collateral.  
A club that aims to strive in the present and near future must be able to properly quantify 
how much it should invest or receive when acquiring/selling a player’s rights. This is 
where models such as the one presented in this study enter, as they offer insight into 
what clubs are actually paying for. The explanatory value of the model featuring only 
player-related variables shows that recent performance is not the sole factor regarding 
how transfer fees are reached. There is a wide array of features that influence those fees; 
some are presented here, but many others were left out. One of those is the fact we 
cannot assume clubs are managed aiming at profits; they mostly sporting results, 
sometimes at the expense of financial steadiness. This will be one of the biggest 
limitations to the use of the conclusions of this study, or the developments applied to it 
by future research. The lack of financial rationality by clubs when dealing with transfers 
can impact both the results of studies such as this (as a fee may not be fully explained 
by any known variable) and their use for progress towards that very rationality.  
One can hardly argue, nevertheless, against the usefulness of a model such as the ones 
here built. The inclusion of more variables, especially those of difficult access to the 
general public, can improve the predictive quality of the overall model. 
The widespread use of these models could benefit the majority of football clubs in their 
decisions to buy or sell, since good decisions are those made with as much information 
as possible. In contexts that are not foreign in the football world, such conflict of interest 
and general lack of transparency, having light shed on what makes a player more 
expensive than others through real data can help both small and big clubs. 
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6. Conclusions and future research 
The football business has changed significantly over the last decades. From the Bosman 
ruling to the involvement of investment funds, the paradigm of transfers in football has 
shifted, with the Federations’ regulations and clubs’ practices evolving in order to keep 
up with the new reality.  
Although the dynamics of transfers in professional football have been previously 
analyzed, it is important to study broader samples and to update them with newer, always-
growing information. 
This study aimed at establishing a connection between players’ sporting performance and 
their transfer value, for player moves in and between the top five European football 
leagues. For this purpose, 383 transfers, over a period of three football seasons, and the 
corresponding players were analyzed, through the compilation of data on individual 
characteristics and performance. The use of a hedonic price model in this context was not 
disruptive, but allowed for the estimation of the impact of each player and club 
characteristic in the overall transfer value. In times of scarce resources for football clubs, 
it is essential to make rational, data-based decisions in relation to high value transfers. 
The use of a model such as the ones here developed can provide a prediction of a player’s 
fair value, in function of his past performance and individual features.  
Using OLS estimation, in line with the existing literature on this topic, two sets of models 
were developed: one featuring only player-related variables, such as physical 
characteristics and performance data, and another one adding club or transfer related 
variables (club reputation, for instance) to the first group. The result of the estimation 
showed that the players’ sporting performance and individual characteristics does not 
explain the entirety of the fees in a transfer deal, with the inclusion of the small number 
of club related variables failing to significantly increase the explanatory value of the 
conceived model. 
Nevertheless, the results obtained display that the inclusion of the performance rating was 
a move towards better comprehension of transfer fees in professional football. 
Performance rating was a key variable in this study, and the estimation indicated it is, as 
expected, a good proxy for transfer value. This index had not yet been featured in studies 
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such as this one, and presents the advantage of comprising the whole of the player’s 
impact in a game, be it offensive or defensive.  
Other apparently straightforward relations, such as the impact of goals, games for the 
National Team or, to a more limited extent, player popularity, were also confirmed by the 
results as positively influencing the fee paid by the buyer club. The most surprising 
conclusion regarding the analyzed sample would fall on the irrelevance of player position 
to the determination of the transfer fee. Here, results showed that fullbacks are less 
expensive than every other position, but indicated no differentiation between those. 
Understandably, a player’s age has a negative effect in player value, indicating that 
potential is more expensive than experience. This seems to have been confirmed over the 
last season (not featured in this study, given its time scope), with several young players 
being traded for record amounts. 
There is, thus, room for improvement in future studies. The inclusion of variables that 
were inaccessible for this study, for being undisclosed or of difficult access for past 
periods, such as agent representing the player, the player’s current wage or number of 
months remaining in his present contract are expected to have a significant impact in the 
predictive power of the model. Following the same rationale, buyout clauses or future 
sell-on values can also make a difference in the transfer value. The interference of a third 
party on the transfer (an investment fund, for example) could be of some significance 
when studying past transfers, but loses some importance for the future due to its official 
ban by FIFA. A club’s revenue can be regarded as a proxy for transfer budget, which may 
therefore influence the negotiation process and lead a selling club to demand more from 
a high revenue generating club than from a low revenue generating club. However, like 
in some of the aforementioned variables, many clubs have their income statements 
private, making the inclusion of this variable in the analysis more difficult. 
Ideally, the next step in the study of this topic would be to include all of these factors and 
combine them with the technological advances in player performance analysis (such as 
the ratings made available by WhoScored), to build a model with a stronger explanatory 
value that can be in fact put to use by decision makers in the football business. 
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Annexes 
EViews outputs 
Model A1 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AERIALS -0.016561 0.589507 -0.028093 0.9776 
AGE -0.809567 0.105014 -7.709155 0.0000 
ASSISTS -0.632360 0.238225 -2.654462 0.0083 
BUYCLUBREP -0.002225 0.004583 -0.485600 0.6276 
BUYLEAGUEREP 0.672754 0.329711 2.040431 0.0421 
CLASSIFICATION -0.018903 0.092250 -0.204910 0.8378 
FIRSTXI -0.495469 3.464948 -0.142995 0.8864 
GAMESNT 0.318897 0.128089 2.489645 0.0133 
GOALS 1.380125 0.439210 3.142289 0.0018 
GOALSNT 0.706829 0.631153 1.119900 0.2635 
GOALRATIO -57.96445 20.84613 -2.780586 0.0057 
GOOGLE 0.004426 0.002377 1.861642 0.0635 
HEIGHT -0.105157 0.044693 -2.352888 0.0192 
MINS 0.001424 0.000723 1.969853 0.0496 
MOTM 0.338616 0.385024 0.879467 0.3798 
PASSING 0.155654 0.073044 2.130972 0.0338 
RATING 4.210410 1.416928 2.971505 0.0032 
RED 0.152103 0.805601 0.188806 0.8504 
YELLOW 0.106216 0.152222 0.697772 0.4858 
SELLCLUBREP -0.012124 0.004799 -2.526228 0.0120 
SELLLEAGUEREP -0.917161 0.263195 -3.484723 0.0006 
SHOTSPG 1.043537 0.852627 1.223908 0.2218 
UCLGAMES -0.025157 0.625158 -0.040240 0.9679 
UCLRATING 3.568704 2.421288 1.473887 0.1414 
UCL -23.39597 15.25405 -1.533754 0.1260 
WINTER 0.873017 1.183932 0.737388 0.4614 
INTERNATIONAL 1.074900 0.906217 1.186140 0.2364 
LOANED -3.921740 0.967696 -4.052656 0.0001 
LEFT 1.286550 1.996193 0.644502 0.5197 
RIGHT 1.393828 1.696733 0.821477 0.4119 
FORWARD -0.571762 1.702576 -0.335822 0.7372 
ATTMID 1.878048 2.024889 0.927482 0.3543 
DEFMID -0.669943 1.352027 -0.495510 0.6206 
FULLBACK -2.118794 1.171391 -1.808783 0.0713 
     
     R-squared 0.625429    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.590011    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 6.693931    Akaike info criterion 6.724862 
Sum squared resid 15638.24    Schwarz criterion 7.075341 
Log likelihood -1253.811    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.863891 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.987219    
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Model A2 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AGE -0.809492 0.105596 -7.665941 0.0000 
ASSISTS -0.667872 0.227483 -2.935918 0.0035 
BUYLEAGUEREP 0.692401 0.313012 2.212064 0.0276 
GAMESNT 0.310040 0.125137 2.477597 0.0137 
GOALS 1.385930 0.427062 3.245268 0.0013 
GOALSNT 0.654182 0.595979 1.097661 0.2731 
GOALRATIO -59.14671 20.09437 -2.943447 0.0035 
GOOGLE 0.004390 0.002296 1.911911 0.0567 
HEIGHT -0.102139 0.039967 -2.555549 0.0110 
MINS 0.001450 0.000465 3.117950 0.0020 
MOTM 0.358630 0.372729 0.962174 0.3366 
PASSING 0.150781 0.059685 2.526279 0.0120 
RATING 4.277445 1.294139 3.305244 0.0010 
SELLCLUBREP -0.011642 0.004254 -2.736522 0.0065 
SELLLEAGUEREP -0.914854 0.244831 -3.736675 0.0002 
SHOTSPG 0.988322 0.736622 1.341696 0.1805 
UCLRATING 3.609353 2.224509 1.622539 0.1056 
UCL -23.71363 15.04996 -1.575661 0.1160 
INTERNATIONAL 1.285056 0.851312 1.509500 0.1320 
LOANED -4.129977 0.903612 -4.570519 0.0000 
ATTMID 2.448564 1.270982 1.926514 0.0548 
FULLBACK -1.667579 0.835952 -1.994826 0.0468 
     
     R-squared 0.622352    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600384    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 6.608710    Akaike info criterion 6.670379 
Sum squared resid 15766.69    Schwarz criterion 6.897159 
Log likelihood -1255.378    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.760339 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.970293    
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Model A3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AGE -0.807909 0.107101 -7.543410 0.0000 
ASSISTS -0.576370 0.232181 -2.482413 0.0135 
GAMESNT 0.449871 0.116920 3.847682 0.0001 
GOALS 2.062588 0.410262 5.027492 0.0000 
GOALRATIO -82.73928 18.04821 -4.584348 0.0000 
HEIGHT -0.124825 0.044186 -2.825027 0.0050 
MINS 0.001406 0.000475 2.960318 0.0033 
RATING 7.321373 1.360609 5.380955 0.0000 
SELLCLUBREP -0.018007 0.004439 -4.056938 0.0001 
SELLLEAGUEREP -0.758636 0.198395 -3.823864 0.0002 
LOANED -4.187353 0.971789 -4.308913 0.0000 
ATTMID 2.922080 1.347046 2.169251 0.0307 
FULLBACK -2.182089 0.803159 -2.716884 0.0069 
     
     R-squared 0.567212    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.553176    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 6.988165    Akaike info criterion 6.759666 
Sum squared resid 18068.75    Schwarz criterion 6.893673 
Log likelihood -1281.476    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.812824 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.042318    
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Model B1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AERIALS -0.149889 0.625294 -0.239710 0.8107 
AGE -0.791751 0.108567 -7.292751 0.0000 
ASSISTS -0.601381 0.243035 -2.474461 0.0138 
FIRSTXI -1.976321 3.127280 -0.631962 0.5278 
GAMESNT 0.356364 0.135526 2.629481 0.0089 
GOALRATIO -71.47092 21.21429 -3.368998 0.0008 
GOALS 1.632994 0.465853 3.505385 0.0005 
GOALSNT 0.838418 0.662171 1.266164 0.2063 
GOOGLE 0.004858 0.002420 2.007360 0.0455 
HEIGHT -0.119830 0.047362 -2.530111 0.0118 
MINS 0.001280 0.000588 2.178201 0.0300 
MOTM 0.229362 0.389269 0.589211 0.5561 
PASSING 0.167359 0.073040 2.291331 0.0225 
RATING 4.326370 1.456783 2.969811 0.0032 
RED 0.204975 0.814874 0.251541 0.8015 
SHOTSPG 1.294604 0.856114 1.512186 0.1314 
UCL -28.65958 15.38970 -1.862258 0.0634 
UCLGAMES -0.161678 0.619649 -0.260919 0.7943 
UCLRATING 4.561822 2.421747 1.883690 0.0604 
YELLOW 0.106565 0.154784 0.688479 0.4916 
RIGHT 1.471289 1.797233 0.818642 0.4135 
LEFT 1.523844 2.063097 0.738620 0.4606 
FORWARD -1.938772 1.749891 -1.107939 0.2686 
ATTMID 0.795892 2.079170 0.382793 0.7021 
DEFMID -1.393795 1.383430 -1.007492 0.3144 
FULLBACK -3.069919 1.128263 -2.720925 0.0068 
     
     R-squared 0.594751    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.566372    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 6.884203    Akaike info criterion 6.761807 
Sum squared resid 16919.03    Schwarz criterion 7.029820 
Log likelihood -1268.886    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.868123 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.983899    
     
     
40 
 
Model B2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AGE -0.806301 0.109141 -7.387674 0.0000 
ASSISTS -0.639788 0.224209 -2.853532 0.0046 
GAMESNT 0.355908 0.134989 2.636564 0.0087 
GOALRATIO -76.27541 20.68009 -3.688351 0.0003 
GOALS 1.742781 0.454120 3.837707 0.0001 
GOALSNT 0.697934 0.628482 1.110507 0.2675 
GOOGLE 0.004785 0.002500 1.914216 0.0564 
HEIGHT -0.131667 0.039451 -3.337494 0.0009 
MINS 0.001575 0.000466 3.376770 0.0008 
PASSING 0.158858 0.060729 2.615842 0.0093 
RATING 4.666339 1.115946 4.181508 0.0000 
SHOTSPG 0.895776 0.765652 1.169953 0.2428 
UCL -27.81444 15.19140 -1.830933 0.0679 
UCLRATING 4.304482 2.244301 1.917961 0.0559 
ATTMID 2.316155 1.322830 1.750910 0.0808 
FULLBACK -2.362754 0.769848 -3.069119 0.0023 
     
     R-squared 0.589190    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.572399    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 6.836190    Akaike info criterion 6.723216 
Sum squared resid 17151.19    Schwarz criterion 6.888147 
Log likelihood -1271.496    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.788642 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.968879    
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Model B3 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FEE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 383    
Included observations: 383   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AGE -0.814815 0.111766 -7.290345 0.0000 
GAMESNT 0.460427 0.124154 3.708519 0.0002 
GOALRATIO -80.71105 17.88766 -4.512109 0.0000 
GOALS 1.945074 0.389069 4.999306 0.0000 
GOOGLE 0.005089 0.002535 2.007668 0.0454 
HEIGHT -0.098147 0.033353 -2.942704 0.0035 
MINS 0.001004 0.000471 2.130849 0.0338 
PASSING 0.175117 0.058252 3.006180 0.0028 
RATING 3.759286 1.063487 3.534867 0.0005 
FULLBACK -2.312604 0.744333 -3.106950 0.0020 
     
     R-squared 0.559626    Mean dependent var 8.663003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.549001    S.D. dependent var 10.45430 
S.E. of regression 7.020741    Akaike info criterion 6.761377 
Sum squared resid 18385.47    Schwarz criterion 6.864459 
Log likelihood -1284.804    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.802268 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967749    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
